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ABSTRACT 
The Fourth European Working Conditions Survey  (European Foundation 2007) is used to 
investigate the readiness of Europe to flexicurity labour market reforms proposed by the 
European Commission (= flexibilization of employment relations compensated by 
improvements in employment security backed up by lifelong learning). For this purpose, 
composite indicators of flexibility, precariousness and decentness of work are constructed 
with the OECD and HBS (Hans Boeckler Stiftung) methodologies which differ in scaling. 
Then the indices are visualized with specially designed tabular graphs and analysed. Both 
methodologies give quite similar results.  
It is revealed that (1) factual flexibility (as it is practiced) radically differs from institutional 
flexibility (prescribed by employment protection legislation), (2) flexibility and 
precariousness of work correlate with statistical certainty, moreover, no country combines 
high flexibility and low precariousness; (3) flexibilization has the strongest negative effect 
on employability; (4) there is an acute shortage of learning options, (5) learning makes a 
negative impact on job satisfaction, at the same time job stability is top esteemed, but not 
income which is ranked only 6th, and (6) working conditions of flexibly employed is worse 
than of normally employed, being even below the European average.  
It implies that the Commission's conception of flexicurity, neglecting the socio-economic 
reality, can be hardly efficient and successful. Therefore, an alternative implementation of 
flexicurity is proposed in the form of flexinsurance which assumes that the employer’s 
contribution to social security should be proportional to the flexibility (precariousness) of 
the employment contract. To stimulate employers to equalize working conditions of normal 
and atypical employees, it is proposed to introduce a workplace tax for bad working 
conditions which should protect 'the working environment' in the same way as the green tax 
protects the natural environment. 
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Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so  
Galileo (1564 – 1642) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the European Commission (2006b; 2007) issued two important documents with 
arguments in favour of the "flexicurity" approach to labour market reforms: Green Paper. 
Modernising labour law to meet the challenges of the 21st century and Towards Common 
Principles of Flexicurity: More and Better Jobs Through Flexibility and Security. Fexicurity 
is explained as a policy which makes compatible flexibilization (= deregulation) of labour 
markets aimed at fostering the competitiveness of European economy with the European 
tradition of welfare state. For this purpose, flexibilization should be compensated with 
improvements in social security and employment security, constituting a kind of trade-off.  
According to the conception of flexicurity, flexibilization should improve firms' 
performance, which in turn should foster production and stimulate labour markets, creating 
'more and better jobs', as declared at the EU Lisbon summit 2000. The 'better jobs' meet the 
ILO (1999) concept of decent work, combining promotion of rights at work; employment; 
social protection; and social dialogue, with employability playing one of central roles. To 
make the idea of decent work clearer, ILO opposes it to precarious work characterized by 
lower income, lower employment stability, lower employability, and lower integration in 
social security schemata; for details see Keller and Seifert (2006) and Seifert and Tangian 
(2007 and 2008). 
The European Commission puts forward the employability as the keystone of the European 
Employment Strategy and, respectively, flexicurity. As emphasized in Employment in 
Europe 2006 by the European Commission (2006a, p. 78): "The main trust of the EU 
recommendation on flexicurity is to encourage a shift … towards employment security … In 
particular, investing in human capital is vital both to improve the long-term employment 
prospects and the employment security of the individual, and also to enhance the 
competitiveness and adaptability of the labour force." In turn, employment security is "to 
provide people with the training they need to keep their skills up-to-date and to develop their 
talent" (European Commission 2007, p. 11). 
Previous empirical reports of the Hans Böckler Foundation showed that the current 
European policy failed to compensate the ongoing deregulation of labour market with social 
security advantages (Tangian 2005; 2006; 2007d).  In other words, the first flexicurity nexus 
'flexibility–social security' does not work. Now European policy makers put forward the 
second flexicurity nexus 'flexibility–employment security'. The compensation is hoped to be 
attained through a higher employability due to lifelong learning, in particular, company-
based training. It is expected to improve the mobility of labour force implying stable 
employment and broad opportunities to move into better jobs. 
Therefore, the consistency of the new flexicurity concept is linked to the impact of 
flexibilization on the decentness–precariousness of work. According to the flexicurity 
concept, flexible work should in no case be precarious and imply a lower employability. On 
the contrary, employability should increase to compensate the negative effects of 
flexibilization. The second point of the Commission's flexicurity concept is the wide 
availability of professional training options and the readiness of Europeans to learn.   
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Empirically testing these conditions as backing the European flexicurity reforms is the aim 
of the given paper. It starts with defining and operationalizing flexibility and precariousness 
of work. The next step describes the model for processing data which stems from the Fourth 
European Working Conditions Survey 2005 (EWCS2005) by the European Foundation 
(2007). To construct the indices of flexibility and precariousness in 31 European countries, 
two methodologies, differing in scaling of variables, are applied. The first is developed at 
the Hans Böckler Foundation (HBS); see Tangian (2005 and 2007a). The second one is due 
to the OECD (2005).  
The empirical analysis with both methodologies reveals that 
(1) factual flexibility (as it is practiced in EU countries) radically differs from institutional 
flexibility (prescribed by the national employment protection legislations), which should 
be taken into account in European  recommendations how to modernise labour law,  
(2) the indices of flexibility and precariousness of work correlate with statistical certainty, 
meaning that flexibility has the opposite effect to the Commission's expectations ('more 
and better jobs through flexibility and security'), moreover, no country combines high 
flexibility with low precariousness (the target flexicurity domain is empty), and  
(3) flexibility has a significant negative impact just on employability, contrary to 
Commission's intentions to improve employability under flexibilization.  
In the second part of the paper, a composite indicator of quality of work is constructed. Its 
sub-indicators reflect 15 aspects of working conditions as in the recently published German 
DGB-index Gute-Arbeit (2007). In a sense, the German indicator is extended to European 
data. It reveals that  
(4) there is an acute shortage of learning options, that is, Europe is not really prepared to 
offer the qualification facilities required for the new labour market strategy;  
(5) learning makes a negative impact on job satisfaction, meaning a latent resistance to 
learning, at the same time job stability is top esteemed, but not income which is ranked 
only 6th, that is, Europeans unambiguously prefer 'just jobs' to 'better jobs' contrary to 
Commission's claims that 'individuals increasingly need employment security rather 
than job security' and that 'there must be…more upward mobility' (European 
Commission 2007, p. 8), and 
(6) working conditions of flexibly employed is worse than of normally employed, being 
even below the European average, so that flexible jobs are in no case 'better jobs'. 
All of these definitively disproves the belief that flexibilization of labour relations can be 
compensated by high employability based on learning. It turns out that employment 
flexibility is little compatible with 'better jobs' and high employability. In particular, the shift 
from job security to employment security suggested by the European Commission cannot be 
consistently implemented, because it contradicts the social and economic actuality. Our 
study provides empirical evidence that a high employability can be hardly attained under 
flexible employment. Besides, Europe is not ready for lifelong learning and Europeans 
latently resist to it. 
Therefore, an alternative conception of flexicurity should be developed. The given paper 
proposes to implement flexicurity in the form of flexinsurance which assumes that the 
employer’s contribution to social security should be proportional to the flexibility 
(precariousness) of the contract to the end of compensating social risks and flexibly 'regulate 
the deregulation'. To motivate employers to equalize working conditions of normal and 
atypical employees, it is proposed to introduce a workplace tax for bad working conditions 
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which should protect 'the working environment' in the same way as the green tax protects the 
natural environment. 
2. OPERATIONALISATION 
The data structure for the first part of the study is shown in Table 1, where each row consists 
of answers of an individual to 42 questions: 29 on flexibility, and 13 on precariousness of 
work. The selection of questions shows how the notions of flexibility and precariousness of 
work are operationally defined in our study. The answers of every individual are aggregated 
into individual indices of degree of flexibility and degree of precariousness of his/her work 
which are put in the right-hand columns of the table. The questions are grouped into three 
sections.  
 
Table 1. Data structure for constructing composite indicators of flexibility and 
precariousness of work; question marks '?' show the aggregation of composite indicators 
 
 
Classifiers. This section includes the "demographic" questions on the country of interview, 
age and sex of the respondent, etc. These data are not used in constructing the individual 
indices but are necessary to build social groups for comparative analysis. For instance, we 
use the country classifier (variable countcod) to compute national averages of individual 
indices considered as country indicators.  
Flexibility. This section includes the questions on flexibility of work grouped according to 
the OECD (1989: 13–20) classification of flexibility types:  
1. External numerical flexibility, that is, is the ease of ’hiring and firing’ which 
manifests itself in the mobility of workers between employers (external job turnover). 
This type of flexibility is reflected by the survey variables linked to the following 
questions: 
• Type of contract (variable q3b): indefinite contract, fixed term contract, 
temporary agency work contract, or work with no contract 
• Duration of contract, in months (q3c)  
 9
  
 
2. Internal numerical flexibility, that is, variability of standard number and of standard 
distribution of working hours. The relevant survey questions are:  
• Number of working hours per week (derivative from variables q15a and 
q15b): as one will or not as one will  
• Overwork (more than 10 hours a day), in number of times a month (q14e)  
• Number of working hours every day (q16aa): variable or constant  
• Number of working days every week (q16ab): variable or constant  
• Starting and finishing hours (q16ac): variable or constant  
• Working time arrangements (q17a): set by the company, choice from several 
option, reasonable adaptability to individual wishes, or full adaptability  
• Working time planning (q17b): on the same day, the day before, several days 
in advance, several weeks in advance, no changes of schedule  
3. Functional flexibility, that is, the changeability of tasks, of teams, and of the content 
of work. It is reflected in the mobility of workers within enterprises (internal job 
turnover). This type of flexibility is reflected by seven questions; here and further see 
Tangian (2007b) for specific questions.  
4. Wage flexibility, that is, dependence of salaries and wages on labour market or 
competitive conditions. This type of flexibility is reflected by seven questions. 
5. Externalization flexibility, that is, such forms as distance working, teleworking, virtual 
organisations and self-entrepreneurial activities. This type of flexibility is revealed by 
six questions.  
Precariousness. According to the typology by Keller and Seifert (2006: 239), the relevant 
survey questions are classified into three groups.  
1. Income, lower for precarious work than for decent work. To measure the income 
factor, five questions are considered.  
2. Employment stability, the certainty to remain at work, characterised by four questions 
on future prospects and past experiences. 
3. Employability, capacity to be employed, characterized by four questions on age 
restrictions for the given work, learning possibilities, health and safety, etc. 
The fourth section of Table 1, Partial indices, is reserved for five first-level aggregate 
flexibility indices (External numerical flexibility, Internal numerical flexibility, etc.) and 
three first-level aggregate precariousness indices (Income, Employment stability, and 
Employability). These indices are obtained for every individual.  
The fifth section of Table 1, Aggregate indices, is reserved for second-level aggregate 
flexibility and precariousness individual indices.  
Every variable (23788 answers to a specific question constituting a table column) are re-
coded with to respect the rule: the higher the value, the more flexible (precarious) is work. 
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)
Then the variables are scaled by two methods which we briefly describe below; for details 
see Tangian (2005, 2006, and 2007a –b).  
Under normalization (HBS method), the variable's min and max are reduced to 0 and 1, 
respectively, and additionally the variable  1 23788(x x … x ′= , ,  is expressed in % of its range:  
 min
max min
100 ,     1, ,23788,ìi
x xy % i
x x
−= ⋅ =− …
  
Under standardization (OECD method), the mean and standard deviation of a variable are 
reduced to 0 and 1, respectively, and optionally is expressed in %: 
 100 ,     1, ,23788,ii
xy % iµσ
−= ⋅ = …  
where 
 
( )
23788
1
23788
2
1
1 (mean)
23788
1 (standard deviation)
23788 1
i
i
i
i
x
x
µ
σ µ
=
=
=
= −−
∑
∑ .
 
The 0 value of y corresponds to the mean of the variable x, and 100% — to its ‘average 
deviation from the mean’.  
To obtain first-level aggregate indices, the recoded and scaled variables (23788-columns of 
the data table) are summarized within eight groups (five flexibility groups, and three 
precariousness ones) and the resulting eight column-vectors are either normalized (HBS 
method) or standardized (OECD method). According to OECD (2005: 21), ‘most composite 
indicators rely on equal weighting, i.e., all variables are given the same weight’, and we 
follow this principle. However, standardization, changing the effective range of variables, 
implicitly introduces deviation-equalizing weights. The second-level aggregate indices of 
flexibility and of precariousness of work are obtained from two groups of first-level 
aggregate indices (five flexibility and three precariousness indices) similarly.  
Under normalization, a first-level aggregated index means the average (coded) response of 
the individual to the relevant questions. 0 and 100 are attained if all questions are answered 
in the most extreme way. Normalization is not appropriate for data with outliers — few large 
deviations from 'typical' values, since the latter are getting clustered. The EWCS do not 
contain outliers, because the answer codes are restricted to a given values. For instance, 
income is restricted to 10 deciles. Therefore, normalization can be consistently applied. 
Unlike normalization, standardization well discriminates between closely located `typical' 
values even in the presence of outliers, because it 'standardizes' the distance between 'typical' 
values. Thereby standardization relativizes 'good' and 'bad' values. For example, the 
flexibility-indicator can have high values and precariousness-indicator — low. After 
standardization, all the values are neither high nor low but medium, and it is impossible to 
judge weather flexible work is precarious or not. The only conclusion could be that, for 
instance, a more flexible work is more precarious. Therefore standardization is adapted 
rather for benchmarking than for evaluation.  
Besides, the standardization is a non-linear non-monotonic function of variables, so that an 
increase of initial indices can result in a decrease of standardized indices. For example, 
consider the following increase in all the initial indices: 
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0 9
all answers improve from 'bad' to 'good'0 100
0 100
1 100
⎯→
9 
 
 
 
After the standardization has been applied, we see no increase from 'bad' to 'good', 
moreover, two of four codes even decrease (shown by frames): 
 50 150
some codes decrease50 50
50 50
150 50
− −
−
− ⎯→
 
 
 
The successive aggregation of indicators inherit these properties of standardization as well.  
Figure 1 depicts the indices of flexibility and precariousness obtained with the HBS method, 
and Figure 2 — the ones obtained with the OECD method. The contribution of first-level 
aggregate indices is shown by the size of bars, incorporating the equalizing weights in case 
of the OECD method. The countries are ordered by the aggregate flexibility and 
precariousness indicated in % at the right-hand end of bars. The role of externalization 
flexibility in the aggregate flexibility under the HBS method is the least. It is not seen under 
the OECD method, which equalizes the role of different factors. Under the HBS method, the 
aggregate index is the mean of the partial indices, being proportional to the total length of 
the bars. Under the OECD method, the aggregate index is no longer proportional to the total 
length of the bars. It is seen in the non-monotonic decrease of the total bar length contrary to 
monotonically decreasing aggregate index — the side effect of the OECD scaling procedure. 
For instance, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg have in Figure 2 the flexibility 
indicators –7 and –11, respectively, but the first total bar is shorter than the second. 
Note that regardless of particularities, both methodologies imply similar country rankings, as 
with regard to flexibility (rank correlation ρ = 0.9182), as with respect to precariousness 
(rank correlation ρ = 0.9335); see Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Correlation coefficients ρ for rankings of EU-31 countries according to HBS and 
OECD method. Source: Author's computations derived from the 4th European Working 
Conditions Survey (European Foundation 2007) 
Aggregated flexibility  0.9182 
External numerical flexibility 0.9994 
Internal numerical flexibility 0.9774 
Functional flexibility 0.9902 
Flexibility 
Wage flexibility 0.9237 
Aggregated precariousness 0.9335 
Precariousness of income   0.7161 
Precariousness of employment stability  0.9921 
Precariousness 
Precariousness of employability  0.9365 
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3. ANALYSIS 
3.1 Difference between institutional and factual flexibility of work   
Table 3 displays indices of institutional and factual flexibility of work in European 
countries. The institutional index is the indicator of strictness of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) of the OECD (2004, p. 117). The factual indices are derived from the data 
of EWCS2005 by either HBS or OECD method as described above.  
Note that Turkey is bottom-ranked with respect to the institutional flexibility and top- 
ranked with respect to factual flexibility. This contradiction is explained as follows. The 
EPL-evaluation is based on institutional arrangements, showing that the Turkish 
employment protection legislation is the most rigid among the OECD countries. The 
empirical survey reveals that 302 of the sample of 454 employees work with no contract, 
meaning that 67% of all employees are not under labour market regulation and are working 
in the most flexible way. A similar situation is inherent in some other countries as well. 
Thereby factual and institutional situations drastically differ. 
 
3.2 Flexibility increases the risk of precarious employment  
Figures 3–4 show the location of European countries on the flexibility–precariousness 
coordinate plane. No country is located in the bottom-right corner of the plot, where high 
flexibility coexists with low precariousness. This main target of the European Commission's 
flexicurity concept looks hardly attainable in practice. The reality is still far from theoretical 
considerations. 
The regression line in Figure 3 computed by the HBS method for 31 European countries also 
shows that the precariousness of work grows as flexibility increases. The slope of the 
regression line is 28% (the first regression equation beyond the plot). The negligible small 
P-value PF=0.0034 excludes the null hypothesis, that the real slope of the line is zero. The 
regression line in Figure 4 computed by the OECD method for 31 countries has the slope 
26%, but the countries are located somewhat differently, and the P-value PF=0.1584.  
The second regression line in both plots is fitted to 23788 individuals. It is less steep, having 
the slope 12% and 7% for the indices computed by the HBS and OECD methods, 
respectively; see the second equation over the plots. However, due to a much larger number 
of observations than for countries, the P-value PF=0.0000 is negligibly small, so that the fact 
of positive correlation between flexibility and precariousness of work is statistically certain 
both under HBS and OECD methods.  
Thus, the regression analysis reveals a positive dependence between aggregate flexibility 
and aggregate precariousness of work all over Europe. No country fulfils the flexicurity 
condition of high flexibility and low precariousness. 
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Figure 1. Flexibility and precariousness indices constructed by the HBS method. Source: 
Author's computations derived from the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European 
Foundation 2007) 
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Figure 2. Flexibility and precariousness indices constructed by the OECD method. Source: 
Author's computations derived from the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European 
Foundation 2007)  
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Table 2. Institutional and factual external numerical flexibility for employees in European 
countries / ranks. Source: First column — OECD (2004: 117); columns 2–4 — author's 
computations derived from the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European 
Foundation 2007) 
 Institutional flexibility   
(OECD 2004, for 2003) 
Factual flexibility                     
(derived from the data of EWCS 2005)  
 Strictness of employment 
protection legislation      
 the opposite to the 
external numerical 
flexibility; the ranking 
relates to flexibility 
∼
External 
numerical 
flexibility    
(HBS 
method) 
External 
numerical 
flexibility     
(OECD 
method) 
Employment 
with no    
contract 
 OECD score 0–5 Normalized 
% 
Standardized 
% 
%  
United Kingdom 0.7 / 1 27 / 6 56 / 6 15 / 6 
Ireland 1.1 / 2 33 / 5 101 / 5 25 / 5 
Switzerland 1.1 / 2 7 / 31 –77 / 30 4 / 20 
Denmark 1.4 / 3 13 / 13 –32 / 13 8 / 11 
Hungary 1.5 / 4 11 / 20 –50 / 19 4 / 18 
Poland 1.7 / 5 17 / 12 –11 / 12 6 / 13 
Czech Republic 1.9 / 6 11 / 19 –50 / 20 2 / 27 
Italy 1.9 / 6 17 / 11 –10 / 11 9 / 8 
Austria 1.9 / 6 19 / 9 2 / 9 11 / 7 
Slovakia 1.9 / 6 9 / 25 –63 / 25 2 / 29 
Finland 2.0 / 7 11 / 18 –48 / 18 3 / 24 
Netherlands 2.1 / 8 9 / 23 –60 / 23 2 / 26 
Belgium 2.2 / 9 8 / 28 –70 / 28 3 / 23 
Germany 2.2 / 9 9 / 24 –61 / 24 3 / 21 
Sweden 2.2 / 9 9 / 27 –65 / 27 1 / 30 
Norway 2.6 / 10 7 / 29 –76 / 29 3 / 22 
Greece 2.8 / 11 41 / 4 148 / 4 32 / 4 
France 3.0 / 12 12 / 16 –42 / 16 5 / 16 
Spain 3.1 / 13 22 / 7 27 / 7 9 / 10 
Portugal 3.5 / 14 20 / 8 11 / 8 9 / 9 
Turkey 3.7 / 15 71 / 1 356 / 1 67 / 1 
Estonia – 13 / 14 –34 / 14 7 / 12 
Cyprus – 48 / 2 199 / 2 42 / 2 
Latvia – 10 / 21 –57 / 21 4 / 19 
Lithuania – 13 / 15 –35 / 15 5 / 15 
Luxemburg – 7 / 30 –78 / 31 1 / 31 
Malta – 46 / 3 184 / 3 41 / 3 
Slovenia – 9 / 26 –63 / 26 2 / 28 
Bulgaria – 19 / 10 2 / 10 6 / 14 
Croatia – 12 / 17 –45 / 17 2 / 25 
Romania – 9 / 22 –59 / 22 5 / 17 
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HBS 
methodology: 
Flexicurity 
domain is empty 
 
Figure 3. Dependence between aggregated flexibility and precariousness indices normalized 
(HBS methodology) for European countries. Source: Author's computations derived from 
the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European Foundation 2007) 
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Figure 4. Dependence between aggregated flexibility and precarious
(OECD methodology) for European countries. Source: Author's com
the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European Foundation 
 18OECD 
methodology: 
Flexicurity 
domain is empt 
ness indices normalized 
putations derived from 
2007) 
  
 
 
Figure 5. Regression coefficients for the dependence of  aggregate indices of precarious 
work on aggregate indices of flexible work computed for 23788 individuals by the HBS and 
OECD methods (upper and lower bars, respectively); non-significant deviation of 
coefficients from zero (P-value > 0.05) is shown by grey font colour. Source: Author's 
computations derived from the 4th European Working Conditions Survey (European 
Foundation 2007) 
 
3.3 Negative impact of flexible work on employability  
A more detailed analysis of the impact of flexibility on precariousness is displayed in Figure 
5. The bars depict the regression coefficients for the dependence between first-level 
aggregate indices. The upper bars are obtained by the HBS method, and the lower ones — 
by the OECD method (the top-left two bars show the regression coefficients 0.12 and 0.07 
from Figures 3–4). Figure 5 shows the following:  
• External numerical flexibility has a low and often statistically non-significant 
influence on all precariousness dimensions except for employment stability which 
precariousness increases as flexibility grows  
• Internal numerical flexibility implies a somewhat precarious income but improves 
the employability which is not surprising 
• Functional flexibility increases the aggregate precariousness, especially the 
precariousness of employability, but has a positive influence on income and 
employment stability. The relative strong correlation between flexibility and 
precariousness of employability can be explained by a reciprocal influence of 
precariousness of employability on flexible employment. One can imagine that those 
with low employability are often employed flexibly rather than normally, finding 
themselves in the vicious circle of flexible–precarious work with little chances to 
escape  
• Wage flexibility has little influence on the aggregate precariousness of work, 
decreases employability, but makes some positive impact on income and 
employment stability  
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• Externalization flexibility improves income, does not much affect employment 
stability, and decreases employability  
• As one can see, HBS and OECD methods give similar results. The regression 
coefficients show that the impact of functional flexibility on precariousness of 
employability is by far stronger than any other impact.  
 
3.4 Insufficient qualification possibilities and learning facilities 
To investigate the second crucial point of the Commission's conception of flexicurity, a 
comprehensive indicator of working conditions based on 126 questions of the Fourth 
European Working Conditions Survey is constructed in a similar way as indicators of 
flexibility and precariousness. The data structure for the indicator is shown in Table 3; for 
details of the construction see Tangian (2007c).  
 
Table 3. Data structure for constructing the hierarchical composite indicator of working 
conditions; question marks '?' show the aggregation of composite indicators 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the composition of the aggregate indicator of working conditions constructed 
with the HBS method (which enables to evaluate the situation); for the similar results 
reflected by the indicator constructed with the OECD methodology see Tangian (2007c). 
The figure is a hybrid of bar graph, table, and map: the tabular values are emphasized by 
colours of geographic maps used to show the relief: low–medium–-high altitude levels are 
shown by blue–green–brown. The 'bad–good' interpretation of the index values are taken 
from the DGB indicator Gute Arbeit. In Figures 6, the countries are arranged in the 
decreasing order of the top-level aggregate indices displayed at the right-hand side of each 
row. 
Two observations are of particular importance: 
• (Bad qualification and development possibilities all over Europe) The corresponding 
first column in Figure 6 is dark blue, meaning a bad evaluation. It is a serious 
warning signal for the European Employment Strategy oriented towards flexible 
employment which requires life-long learning. 
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Figure 6. Composition of aggregate indices 'Total quality of work' computed with the HBS 
method. Source: Author's computations derived from the 4th European Working Conditions 
Survey (European Foundation 2007) 
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• (Poor career chances all over Europe and modest income) The third column in Figure 
6 exhibits a bad or inferior evaluation with respect to career chances of all countries 
except Denmark with 61 points (lowest medium level). The income evaluation does 
not surpass the medium threshold as well. It does not meet the claims for 'better jobs' 
in the European Agenda 2010. 
 
3.5 Importance of different aspects of working conditions  
The Survey question on general satisfaction of working conditions Q36 enables to 
investigate the influence of the 15 sub-indicators on the job satisfaction by means of 
stepwise regression. At first the independent variable is found which provides alone the best 
fit (= the sub-indicator which has the greatest impact on the satisfaction with working 
conditions) and includes it into the regression model. Then the next variable is found which, 
being included into the model, improves the fit best (= the partial indicator which has the 
next greatest impact on the satisfaction with working conditions), and so on. Figure 7 
computed with the HBS method (which enables to evaluate the situation in non-relativized 
'bad–good' terms) displays the rankings of different factors by country with the ranks shown 
explicitly and by colours to emphasize the 'relief' of the graph. 
Which conclusions can be derived from Figure 7? 
• (Most important aspect: job stability) The aspect 14 'Job stability' gets the top 
European rank and is also highly ranked in all the European countries. Comparing to 
Figure 6, some countries with relatively high job stability (Northern countries like 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, as well as former socialist countries and Malta) 
do not show the top interest in job stability. 
• (Income is relatively low important) The income is ranked only as the 6th important 
aspect of working conditions. The general satisfaction with working conditions in 10 
of 31 countries does not significantly depend on income, although many Europeans 
find it insufficient. 
• (Negative attitude to qualitative management, training, and creativity) The quality of 
management and qualification and development possibilities have a negative, 
although not strong, impact on the general satisfaction with working conditions all 
over Europe (often non-significant, as in Germany). Creativity is also perceived 
rather as a disadvantage, and possibilities for influence are ranked quite low. At the 
same time, training is highly desired by 70% persons in the direct German inquiry 
(DGB Index Gute Arbeit 2007, p. 24). A similar response is cited by European 
Commission (2007, p.8). It means that there is a difference between rational 
understanding shown in answers to explicit questions and unconscious reaction 
revealed in our indirect analysis. It looks that Europeans are stressed by managerial 
attention, learning, and necessity to show initiative rather than enjoy them. A latent 
resistance to learning can be the cause its low efficiency, and, consequently, of low 
motivation of employers to invest in training, resulting in poor training possibilities 
demonstrated by Figure 6.  
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Figure  7. Importance of different aspects of working conditions for general satisfaction by 
the HBS method. Source: Author's computations derived from the 4th European Working 
Conditions Survey (European Foundation 2007) 
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Figure 8. Composition of aggregate indices 'Total quality of work' computed with the HBS 
method by the type of contract. Source: Author's computations derived from the 4th 
European Working Conditions Survey (European Foundation 2007) 
 
3.6 Working conditions of atypically employed are worse than that of normally employed  
Figure 8 depicts the indices of working conditions computed with the HBS method by the 
type of contract. Those with permanent contracts have the best conditions, and others have 
inferior working conditions which are even worse than the European average. It shows that 
the Commission's claim for 'more and better jobs through flexibility and security' finds no 
confirmation in reality. 
4. REFORM PROPOSAL: FLEXINSURANCE AND WORKPLACE TAX 
As follows from the empirical studies, the Commission's recommendations for flexicurity 
are little compatible with actuality, implying difficulties in the policy implementation. A 
possible solution could be flexinsurance together with elements of the basic minimum 
income model and workplace tax. 
Flexinsurance assumes that the employer’s contribution to social security should be 
proportional to the flexibility of the contract (Tangian 2006, 2007a). Progressive charges to 
constrain dismissals are already used in the US unemployment insurance based on 
experience rating (Graser 2002). The experience rating is the frequency of dismissals in the 
enterprise which determines the employer’s contributions to unemployment insurance: the 
more frequent the dismissals, the higher the contributions. It is analogous to motor insurance 
whose price is influenced by the frequency of accidents. The US practice has two important 
properties: (1) it operates on the financially fair risk-compensation basis, and (2) it 
constrains the general freedom of the employer to dismiss. The shortcoming of the US 
experience rating is that the risk of becoming unemployed is linked to dismissals only, and 
pays no regard to the duration and other particularities of the work contract. 
Another example of bridging legislation with taxation/insurance is the Austrian Severance 
Act 2002 (Abfertigungsrecht) recognized to be a good practice both by the European 
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Commission (2006b) and the OECD (2006). The severance payment is accumulated 
throughout the whole career of employees at special severance accounts which are 
accessible upon dismissals or retirement. Employers make obligatory contributions to these 
accounts of 1.53% of salaries paid and are no longer charged with severance payments in 
case of dismissals. Since dismissals were relatively easy in Austria, severance pay was the 
major constraint. After the reform, dismissals became a quite formal procedure, and 
employers got freedom to make quick labour force adjustments for the flat 1.53%-
'flexibilization tax'. 
From the employees' viewpoint, the Abfertigungsrecht is a kind of firing insurance. 
European Commission (2006b) argues that its advantage is that a benevolent change of a job 
does not mean loosing the severance entitlement for a long tenure. The weakness of the 
Abfertigungsrecht is that it is case-independent and does not constrain firings. The interests 
of employers are little affected by dismissals, because they are seldom charged with 
severance payments extra to the obligatory social contributions.   
Comparing to these prototype practices, flexinsurance has the following advantages: 
• (Financial fairness) A higher risk of atypical employees becoming unemployed is 
fairly compensated, depending on every particular contract, and contributions to 
social security correspond to the expectation of unemployment benefits.  
• (Reasonable employment flexibility) Social security contributions conditioned by the 
type of the contract affect employers’ labour costs. Flexinsurance thereby motivates 
employers to hire employees on more favourable conditions, but does not rigidly 
restrict labour market flexibility. 
• (Legislative advantages) Flexinsurance is a flexible instrument for ‘regulating the 
labour market deregulation’. Adjusting the employers’ contributions needs no new 
legislation but just administrative decisions. It is similar to regular changes in 
payments to statutory health insurance.  
• (Social justice) Providing advantages from flexibilization to employers is not 
socially just, especially in the background of increasing inequality. Indeed, every 
step towards a higher level of labour flexibility meets the interests of employers. The 
business world gets rid of restrictions, managers improve performance by rotating 
and squeezing personnel, and firms gain higher profits. All expenses are covered by 
the state — costly reforms and additional social security expenditure. This type of 
flexibilisation scenario therefore turns out to be a long-term indirect government 
subsidy/gift to firms. Since the state budget originates from taxpayers, employees 
contribute considerably to this subsidy/gift through the sophisticated money loop 
supported by legislation, social security and tax systems.  
Therefore, flexinsurance is also a policy measure to meet the principle of social 
justice: employers get no one-sided advantages free of charge. The importance of 
social feelings is also emphasized in Common Principles (p. 14): 'Active labour 
market policies, too, have a positive effect on the feeling of security among workers'. 
The basic minimum income assumes a flat-rate income paid by the state to all residents, 
regardless of their earnings and property status (Polanyi 1944). Examples of this model 
appear in some social security branches, such as childcare allowances or old-age provisions. 
For instance, Kindergeld in Germany is paid to all parents. Several basic minimum options 
apply to retirement in Switzerland (Brombacher-Steiner 2000), and legislation on solidarity 
pensions is currently underway in Chile (Chile Presidential Advisory Council 2006). In a 
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sense, the concept of a basic minimum income is incorporated into the minimum wage 
(Schulten et al. 2006). The additional budget expenditure incurred in the basic minimum 
income can be covered by: 
• flexinsurance,  
• higher taxation of high earners (to cover the flat-rate income), and  
• funds released from reducing the number of civil servants currently working in social 
security (since the system becomes simpler).  
The workplace tax is supposed to be imposed on the employers who offer bad working 
conditions. Similarly to the green tax in the environment protection which stimulates 
enterprises to consider the natural environment, the workplace tax should stimulate 
enterprises to consider the working environment. Indexing working conditions can be 
regarded as measuring the 'social pollution' and used to determine the tax amount. A fraction 
of the tax can be paid directly to the employee as a bonus for bad working conditions. 
However, its significant fraction should be paid to the state to keep the situation under the 
statutory control.   
The workplace tax is particularly topical for atypical employees who, as has been shown, 
have worse working conditions. If 'more and better jobs' should be attained 'through 
flexibility' then their quality should be controlled and secured.   
Additionally, the regulation of atypical employment can also learn from the analogy with 
regulation of immigrants, who are 'less integrated' in the mainstream that the nationals. For 
instance, there can be quotas for atypical contracts (like immigration quotas), employers can 
be required to justify their necessity (like the obligation to employ own nationals in the first 
turn), issuing a permanent contract after a number of successive temporary contracts (like 
the permanent residence permit after a few years of temporary residence), etc. These 
measures are aimed at reasonably constraining employment flexibility without excluding it 
in case of its real necessity.   
The last factor − but not the least − in preserving the European welfare state is action to 
constrain the European financial markets. In fact, foreign investments actually mean 
export of jobs from Europe to other countries. Employers are given a legal instrument for 
exerting pressure on European governments: ‘If you do not relax employment protection 
according to our requirements, we shall move jobs abroad’. Having liberalised financial 
markets, European governments paved the way to loss of control over labour markets. Since 
the way out is generally through the same door as the way in, financial markets must be 
constrained to some extent in order to restore control − if social priorities are to be 
respected.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
• Composite indicators of flexibility, precariousness, and decentness of work are 
constructed from the data of 4th European Working Conditions Survey for 31 
European countries by two methodologies differing in scaling (OECD and HBS).  
Both families of indicators give similar results visualized by means of specially 
designed table graphs, combining properties of tables, graphs, and geographic maps.  
• Benchmarking countries with respect to the flexibility indicators shows that the 
institutional regulation of employment reflected by the EPL-index of the OECD does 
not necessarily imply the adequate factual effect.  
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• The analysis of interaction of flexibility and precariousness indices shows that the 
more flexible employment, the more it is precarious. The employment flexibility has 
the most negative effect just on the employability. 
• The indicator of decentness of work based on 15 composite sub-indicators shows (1) 
acute shortage of learning options, and (2) worse working conditions of flexibly 
employed comparing to that of normally employed, which are even below the 
European average.  
• The indicator of job satisfaction regarded as a function of 15 composite sub-indicators 
of working conditions shows that (1) learning makes a negative impact on job 
satisfaction and (2) job stability is top esteemed for job satisfaction, but not income 
which is ranked only the 6th (HBS methodology) or 5th (OECD methodology),  
• It implies serious arguments against the recent proposals of the European 
Commission to implement flexicurity as based on lifelong learning. A shift from job 
security towards employment security within such a strategy cannot be consistently 
implemented. Our study provides empirical evidence that flexibility increases the 
risks of precarious employment and that a high employability is hardly attainable 
under flexible employment. Moreover, no European country provides sufficient 
facilities for lifelong learning which is intended to back up employment security 
under flexibilization. 
• An alternative implementation of flexicurity might include flexinsurance and 
workplace tax with some other social and economic measures. 
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